people talk about mental states actually vary across cultures and individuals? How does this variation relate to a presumably universal competence? To what extent does making knowledge of others' mental states explicit facilitate cooperation and communication? Despite the centrality of these questions, few quantitative studies of mental-state talk in a society with such norms have been conducted. Thus, we measured mental state language in a small-scale society with implicit norms against attributing mental states to others. An explicit quantification of mentalstate talk provides a metric against which ethnographic accounts can be measured. Should the data suggest differences in patterns of mental-state talk, subsequent studies are warranted. However, it is critical to first assess the truth of the claims.
A simple response-elicitation task was administered in Spanish to bilingual Shuar / Spanish speakers in a small-scale, hunter-horticulturalist society in Amazonian Ecuador (N=40, 20 female) as well as in English to a sample of American undergraduates (N=20, 15 female). Participants were shown a set of eight silent videos. Each set contained six videos designed to elicit mental state language (MS) and two videos that served as controls (C). MS videos depicted naturalistic interactions between multiple agents and featured richly mentalistic content, such as one character tricking another character. C Videos depicted causal, but inanimate agents interacting. Each video was 30-45 seconds long.
After each video, participants described what happened in the scene. Participants received a minimal prompt to reduce task demands and capture variation in the extent to which mental states were reported. Shuar participants were expected to describe scenes using less mentalizing language than American participants. Verbal responses were transcribed and coded according to a scheme adapted from Castelli et al. (2000) and Ruffman et al. (2002) . Word counts for affective states, desire, epistemic states, and perception were obtained. Counts per description were scaled by description length to control for differences in verbosity. Hierarchical Poisson Regression models of word counts were run with culture and video type as fixed factors and participant as a random factor.
American participants were found to use words attributing perception, affective states, and epistemic states to characters significantly more often than were Shuar participants, while Shuar participants used desire words more frequently. These data confirm that our Shuar participants were less likely than Western participants to describe scenes they had witnessed in terms of an agent's mental states. These data are important for a complete understanding of the evolution of language. Language cannot be understood as apart from the mentalizing capacity from which it followsthe two are inextricably linked and undergird human beings' uniquely elaborated sociality.
